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Foreword 
 
 
 
Each year the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at The Department of Economics, BI 
Norwegian School of Management appoints an independent group of experts to evaluate 
monetary policy in Norway.  
This year the committee consists of Hilde C. Bjørnland, professor of Economics at BI and 
Bjørn Roger Wilhelmsen, Senior Analyst at First Securities. The committee is solely 
responsible for the report and the views therein. The report does not necessarily represent the 
views of the CME or of its members. 
The Ministry of Finance partly funds the Norges Bank Watch reports, which contain useful 
information and analyses for the Ministry’s evaluation of monetary policy that is presented 
each year in a White Paper to Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo, 9 February 2011 
 
Centre for Monetary Economics 
 
Arne Jon Isachsen 
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Executive summary 
 
 
Monetary policy in 2010 
 
Overall, the committee considers the Norges Bank’s decisions to signal delays in expected 
future interest rate increases in the first half of 2010 were well balanced and consistent with 
incoming information: The recovery in the Norwegian economy was weaker, inflationary 
pressures softer and global interest rates lower than expected at the beginning of the year. 
 
In the committees view, Norges Bank cannot be blamed for overestimating the outlook for 
Mainland-Norway growth at the beginning of the year. After all, the momentum in the 
economy had showed signs of improvement in late 2009 and the Bank’s view was consistent 
with consensus at that time.  
 
The weaker than expected economic recovery had consequences for future inflationary 
pressures. Interestingly, notwithstanding the fact that underlying inflation developed broadly 
in line with or slightly above the Norges Bank’s inflation projections in the first half of 2010, 
the Bank revised its forecast for future price inflation down in Monetary Policy Report (MPR) 
1 and MPR 2. This demonstrates that the Norges Bank’s assessment of inflation prospects 
over the medium term was based on a forward looking approach.   
 
Indicators of economic growth picked up over the summer and in Monetary Policy Report 
3/2010 forecasts for GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 were revised up. These changes pushed 
up the interest rate forecast in 2012 and 2013. The committee would have expected these 
revisions to have contributed to a slightly higher interest rate path in 2011 as well. 
 
Moreover, the communication associated with the faster increase in home prices after the 
Board meeting in December should have been less ambiguous and should have included a 
discussion about possible implications for monetary policy if the sharp increase were to 
continue. Added to that, the contradicting signals whether the increase in house prices had 
increased more than expected or not, may suggest that there is scope for improvement when it 
comes to integrating financial stability considerations in the discussions of monetary policy. 
 
Finally, the Norges Bank may consider – as a rule – to discuss whether expected future rates 
among trading partners prevailing in the market look reasonable or not in every MPR’s. 
Alternatively, the Bank may consider publishing an own path for future interest rates among 
trading partners based on its best judgment in its MPR’s. 
 
 
Economic performance in the inflation targeting period- stylized facts 
 
Stability of key economic variables in Norway and some comparable countries are examined 
in the inflation targeting period, with the aim to establish some stylized facts of the economic 
performance and raise some issues that may be a concern for monetary policy in the future. It 
is the committee’s view that monetary policy in Norway has been a success in terms 
achieving inflation rates close to the target and contributing to sustainable growth rates in the 
Norwegian economy. Contrary to much concern when inflation targeting was introduced, the 
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nominal exchange rate has also, with the exception of the brief period 2001-2003, remained 
fairly stable over this period, although on average, it has appreciated slightly.  
 
Yet, despite being more gradual in its approach, Norges Bank still ranks as one of the most 
aggressive central banks with regard to interest rate volatility. The volatility was particularly 
high in the years of 2001-2003, contributing also to increased exchange rate volatility in that 
period.  
 
The recent decade has also witnessed high variation in equity prices and unprecedented high 
growth rates in house prices. Notwithstanding that there are many factors explaining the 
variation in asset prices, monetary policy has clearly played a role. While we do not think the 
high growth rates in asset prices poses a major treat at the very short horizon, the high pass 
through from short term interest rates to asset prices coupled with high debt ratios makes the 
Norwegian economy more vulnerable to shocks in the future.  
 
 
Financial Stability and Monetary Policy in Practice 
 
Norges Bank argues that both financial stability and price stability considerations should be 
important when making monetary policy decisions. Yet, it is not clear to us what weight is 
attached to each consideration and how specific analysis and recommendations from financial 
stability is integrated into the actual monetary policy framework.  
 
The committee suggests that Norges Bank makes it clearer as to how the issues of major 
concern in financial stability influence monetary policy decisions in practice. In particular, 
judgment as to how the risk of future financial imbalances may (or may not) disturb activity 
and inflation somewhat further ahead could be more emphasized. This is in particular 
important in the current phase, since the model suit in Norges Bank has not yet fully 
incorporated financial variables.  
 
 
 
Communication – The role of the Executive Board 
 
One important implication of having a central bank which targets inflation is that current 
economic behaviour will depend on expectations about monetary policy. The communication 
of the central bank therefore becomes an extremely important aspect of monetary policy.   
 
The committee finds the monetary policy report, the press release and the report to the 
Executive Board with background and charts informative and well communicated, although 
the latter too detailed compared to the main message it should try to get across. Still we miss a 
clearer exposition of the role and explanation of the Bank’s use of models of various kinds in 
arriving at its assessment of current circumstances as well as the proper policy stance. We 
also miss the reasoning behind judgments made to change or override the models. 
 
The committee believes that a record of the discussion that has preceded the decisions at the 
Executive Boards meetings would be very useful and make monetary policy more transparent 
and credible. Making such information available would require minutes to be released from 
the policy meetings.  
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Hence, the committee suggests that non-attributed minutes should be published, in order to 
strengthen accountability and further improve transparency. These minutes could note, 
without attribution to individual members, which issues were discussed and what arguments 
were presented. Non-attributed minutes will reveal the scope and depth of the policy 
discussion, but will not identify the individual contributions of the members. This would be 
useful in providing an indication of the degree of disagreement and/or uncertainty among the 
members. This, in turn, would assist the private sector in learning the monetary policy 
reaction function more efficiently.  
 
 
The forecast process – number of forecast a year 
 
Norges Bank’s Executive Board meets eight times a year. The forecasts are not updated 
except on the three occasions when the Monetary Policy report is published. An exception 
was in December 2008, when the unexpected depth of the financial crisis required new 
forecasts for the expected policy stance.  
 
The committee suggests that while Norges Bank should keep the number of monetary policy 
reports at three per year, it should consider publishing a press release and a monetary policy 
update in conjunction with at least one of the other meetings of the Executive Board. The 
monetary policy update should contain a limited number of forecasts for central 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
 
Measure of underlying inflation 
 
Extraordinary fluctuations in different product markets or changes in taxes and subsidies may 
render the consumer price inflation very volatile. To ignore these temporary fluctuations, 
most central banks, including Norges Bank, therefore also construct indicators of so-called 
underlying inflation, where these extraordinary fluctuations are removed. While we encourage 
Norges Bank in publishing these measures, we are sceptical with regard to the use of CPIXE 
(CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices) as their 
main indicator of underlying inflation in the policy process, for which they provide 
conditioned, detailed forecasts.  
 
The committee suggest that CPI-ATE (CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy 
products), or a related measure constructed by Statistics Norway, should be used as the focus 
measure instead of CPIXE, while taking its disadvantages more explicitly into account in 
times of rapid changes in forward prices on energy. This can be done by using the other 
indicators more actively (including CPIXE), by discussing how and why they differ from the 
current CPI inflation rates.  
 
Furthermore, when discussing the profile for inflation over the medium term in section 1 of 
the Monetary Policy Report (Monetary policy assessments and strategy), it is the committee’s 
view that the likely path for headline CPI inflation should take a more prominent role than has 
so far been the case. This should allow for a deeper discussion of the extent to which sharp 
increases in energy prices, taxes or other external disturbances may influence consumer price 
inflation over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This report, Norges Bank Watch 2011, is an evaluation of the conduct of monetary policy in 
Norway in 2010. This report will not evaluate the institutional framework for monetary 
policy. Like previous Norges Bank Watch reports, we adopt the ex-ante rather than the ex-
post perspective, i.e. our assessment of the conduct of monetary policy is solely based on the 
information available when decisions were made, not data and information that became 
known afterwards.  
 
The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2011 met with Norges Bank on November, 23 2010 
and with the Ministry of Finance on November, 22 2010. We wish to thank Norges Bank for 
supplying us with useful data.  
 
The committee would also like to thank Ida Wolden Bache, Arne Jon Isachsen and Erling 
Steigum for constructive comments. The responsibility for errors and omissions rests solely 
with the committee, however. 
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2. Monetary policy in 2010 
 
When entering 2010, the Executive Board of the Norges Bank had already begun a process of 
gradually reversing previous policy accommodation with two interest rate increases in the 
fourth quarter of 2009. The bank had also signaled that further interest rate increases were 
likely in the course of 2010. Alongside the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Norges Bank was 
among the first central banks in the world to start increasing interest rates, after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers a year earlier caused a crisis in financial markets and 
plummeting global economic activity.  
 
The impact on the Norwegian economy of the financial crisis appeared less pronounced than 
previously feared, partly thanks to stabilization and a subsequent rise in commodity prices, as 
well as swift policy responses by the Government and the central bank, which helped solving 
the liquidity crisis in the Norwegian banking system and boosted households’ disposable 
income. As a result, private consumption and the housing market posted significant gains 
during 2009. 
 
The monetary policy outlook for 2010 was among other factors based on a quite optimistic 
forecast for growth in the Mainland Norway economy, in particular supported by expectations 
of a very strong recovery in private consumption.  
 
But these expectations turned out to be too optimistic. Growth in private consumption slowed 
in the first half of 2010 and the Bank’s projection for growth in private consumption in 2010 
was cut to 2 ¾ % in Monetary Policy Report (MPR) 3/10, from 5 ½% a year earlier. In the 
same period, the projection for Mainland-Norway GDP growth was cut by 1 percentage point 
to 1 ¾% (see Figure 2.3).  
 
In this context, price and cost pressures turned out to be more subdued in 2010 than the 
Norges Bank had expected. Low external price impulses amplified the disinflation trend 
(Figure 2.2).  
 
The weaker than expected performance of the Norwegian economy in 2010 was not mirrored 
by a corresponding weakness abroad. Quite the opposite, the Bank’s projection for GDP 
growth among trading partners in 2010 was revised up to 3%, from 1 ¼ % a year earlier.  
But despite an upward revision of the international economic outlook, market participants 
downgraded their expectations of future interest rate moves among major central banks amid 
sovereign debt concerns and a second round of unconventional monetary policy easing by the 
Federal Reserve.  
 
In sum, these developments contributed to delay the monetary tightening process in Norway 
(Figure 2.1). The key policy rate was raised only once, by 25 bp in May 2010, and near-term 
interest rate prospects were revised down in all three Monetary Policy Reports published in 
2010. As the factors behind the downward revisions in the first half of 2010 and the second 
half of the year differed somewhat, the evaluation of monetary policy in these two periods is 
done separately.  
 
9 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Sight deposit rate projections
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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Figure 2.2: CPIXE and projections
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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2.1  January – June; Disappointing growth and turbulent financial market conditions  
 
The first monetary policy meeting of the Norges Bank Board in 2010 was on 3 February. 
Having raised its key policy interest rate by 25 basis points both in October and December 
2009, the Board decided to leave its key policy rate on hold at this meeting, a decision which 
was widely expected. This decision was consistent with the interest rate projection outlined in 
MPR 3/09; the baseline scenario in the Report was to raise interest rates either in December 
2009 or February 2010, and the Board chose the former.   
 
According to the press release following the Board’s decision, the outlook for petroleum 
investment was deemed weaker than previously assumed, but so far this was counterbalanced 
by stronger than expected growth in export. Overall, incoming information had been broadly 
in line with expectations, but with one important exception; the NOK exchange rate was 
somewhat stronger than projected. The press release warned that “Should the krone 
appreciate considerably more than projected, the key policy rate may be increased to a lesser 
extent or later than envisaged in October”. 
 
The trade weighted NOK exchange rate continued to remain stronger than projected in the 
period up to the next Board meeting on 24 March. In addition, expected future interest rates 
among trading partners had fallen considerably amid heightened concerns over fiscal 
sustainability in some European countries.  Furthermore, incoming data on growth in Norway 
was on balance weaker than anticipated; Mainland-Norway GDP grew at a significantly 
slower pace than expected in Q4 2009 amid plunging business investments.  
 
Meanwhile, underlying inflation had developed broadly in line with projections. In fact, 
CPIXE inflation was actually slightly higher than expected, but incoming information 
regarding wage development in 2010 were more subdued than previously assumed.  
 
In its baseline scenario in MPR 3/09 the Norges Bank signalled a 50/50 chance of a hike at 
this meeting, but the Executive Board decided to leave key policy interest rates on hold. This 
decision was expected by nine out of ten economists according to a Reuters poll.  
 
In MPR 1/10, published simultaneously, the Norges Bank interest rate projection was revised 
down. The main reason for this downward revision since MPR 3/09, was lower expected 
interest rates abroad and a stronger NOK exchange rate, but domestic factors contributed as 
well (Figure 2.4). In its baseline scenario, growth in Mainland-GDP was cut by ½ percentage 
points in both 2010 and 2011. Prospects for wage growth and price inflation were also revised 
down.  
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At first glance, the contribution from “demand” to changes in the interest rate forecast 
appeared modest considering the noticeable weaker than expected pace of recovery in the 
Norwegian economy.  This has to be viewed in the context of a lower growth estimate for 
potential output, justified by the massive drop in business investments. Consequently, the 
output gap was little changed. 
 
The new interest rate forecast was consistent with a 25 bp increase to 2% at the Board 
meeting on 5 May. Economists in the market were split ahead of the meeting, but the majority 
(eight of eleven economists according to a Reuters poll) expected a hike.  
 
The Executive Board decided to raise the key policy rate in accordance with its base line 
scenario.  However, the press release revealed that the decision was close as the Board 
considered the alternative of leaving the key policy rate unchanged at that meeting, mainly 
due to turbulence in the market for government debt. Longer-term bond yields had increased 
considerably in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain.  The Board noted that the risk of weaker 
than expected developments in EU countries – with possible spill-over effects to Norway - 
had increased. This was interpreted by the market as a hint that future interest rate increases 
may be delayed if the financial market turbulence were to continue.  
 
The turbulence in the market for government debt continued indeed up to the policy meeting 
on 23 June. In the press release following a decision to leave rates on hold - which was 
expected by all economists surveyed - the Board made a note of the high yields on 
government bond yields in countries with weak public finances which had translated into 
higher spreads between money market rates and expected future central banks rates also in 
Norway.  
 
Moreover, as many European countries were compelled to implement substantial fiscal 
tightening, the Board decided to cut the forecast for trading partners’ growth in 2011 and 
2012 in its MPR 2/10. Markets participants seemed to agree that the recovery in advanced 
economies was likely to lose momentum going forward, as reflected by a decline in expected 
future key policy rates among major trading partners.  
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Furthermore, the recovery in Norway had been somewhat weaker than Norges Bank expected 
as business investments continued to contract and the household saving ratio remained 
elevated. The latter was interpreted being related to heightened uncertainty among households 
concerning developments abroad and their potential impact on Norway. According to the 
press release, “the economic outlook is more subdued as a result of developments in Europe”    
 
Due to the slower than expected pace of the economic recovery in Norway, the Board decided 
yet again to cut its forecast for inflation over the medium term. A slightly lower than expected 
outcome of the centralized wage negotiations in the private sector also supported a lower 
profile for underlying inflation.  
 
In sum, these developments by far outweighed the effect of a weaker krone exchange rate on 
the interest rate outlook, leading to a downward revision of the interest rate path. In the 
baseline scenario the first hike was projected around the turn of the year.  
 
     
 
When accounting for the factors behind the decision to change the interest rate profile, the 
Norges Bank added a smoothing-bar which represented a preference for stable interest rates 
instead of “abrupt and unexpected changes in the key policy rate” (see Figure 2.5). 
According to the Board’s judgment, the rise in money market premiums should be considered 
temporary. Interestingly, had the Bank not added this judgment, the Bank’s reaction function 
would imply an immediate and transitory cut in the interest rate.   
 
 
Assessment  
 
Norges Bank cannot be blamed for overestimating the outlook for Mainland-Norway growth 
at the beginning of the year. After all, the momentum in the economy had showed signs of 
improvement in late 2009 and the Bank’s view was consistent with consensus at that time.  
 
The weaker than expected economic recovery had consequences for future inflationary 
pressures. Interestingly, notwithstanding the fact that underlying inflation developed broadly 
in line with or slightly above the Norges Bank’s inflation projections in the first half of 2010, 
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the Bank revised its forecast for future price inflation down in both MPR 1 and MPR 2. This 
demonstrates that the Norges Bank’s assessment of inflation prospects over the medium term 
was based on a forward looking approach.   
 
The committee therefore considers the Norges Bank’s gradual re-assessment of expected 
future inflation being appropriate on balance, even if measures of underlying inflation over 
the summer came in somewhat lower than projected.     
 
NBW view 
 
Overall, the committee considers the Norges Bank’s decisions to signal delays in 
expected future interest rate increases in the first half of 2010 were well balanced and 
consistent with incoming information: The recovery in the Norwegian economy was 
weaker, inflationary pressures softer and global interest rates lower than expected at the 
beginning of the year.  
 
 
2.2 August – December; Growth picked up, but inflation fell more than expected 
 
The accumulation of news over the summer had been slightly more upbeat as regard the 
growth outlook for Norway. In particular, new industrial orders and business confidence had 
picked up following an increase in oil companies’ investment plans, suggesting somewhat 
better growth prospects in the second half of the year.  
 
Meanwhile, the international environment had improved somewhat as turbulence related to 
public finances in several European countries had receded, even though survey-based 
indicators of growth (such as PMIs) signaled a weaker momentum in the economic recoveries 
of several countries.    
 
According to the press release following the Board meeting on 11 August, developments in 
Norway and abroad were deemed to be “broadly in line with expectations”.  The Board also 
noted that consumer price inflation had slowed as expected and decided to leave its key policy 
rate unchanged at 2%. This decision was widely expected.   
 
The key policy rate remained on hold also after the Board meeting on 22 September, which 
was anticipated by all twelve economist polled by Reuters prior to that meeting. In the press 
statement the Board reiterated that growth in Norway was picking up as expected, while 
noting that “activity among some of Norway’s most important trading partners increased 
more than expected in the first half of the year and growth in Asia remains high”. Financial 
markets had also stabilized somewhat after the summer turbulence.  
 
Despite the more positive assessment of the external environment, expected future interest 
rates among trading partners were markedly lower than at the time Monetary Policy Report 
2/10 was published. This should at least partly be interpreted in light of signals by Fed 
officials about possible extensions of policy accommodation.   
 
Moreover, consumer price inflation had slowed to a slightly lower rate than expected, in 
particular due to lower prices on imported consumer goods. Looking ahead, the Board was of 
the opinion that “new information may indicate that inflation in the coming months will be 
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slightly lower than projected in June”. This was interpreted by the market as a signal that the 
next increase in the key policy rate could be delayed further.  
 
Underlying inflation continued to fall in the period up the next Board meeting on 27 October, 
motivating a widely expected no-change in rates and a further delay in the estimated upward 
shift in interest rates. To be precise, prospects for the next interest rate hike were postponed 
by around six months to the summer of 2011 (June or August), according to the baseline 
scenario in MPR 3/10 published contemporaneously.   
 
     
 
Meanwhile, the Board revised its forecast for Mainland-Norway GDP growth in 2011 and 
2012 up on expectations of higher oil and gas investments and stronger exports growth. While 
this was expected to boost capacity utilization and eventually bring up inflation over the 
medium term, it had no effect on the interest rate path in 2011. 
 
When accounting for the factors behind the changes in the interest rate path (Figure 2.6), the 
impact of higher capacity utilization was considered to offset the negative impact from lower 
interest rates abroad in 2012 and 2013. In fact, the outlook for interest rates in 2013 was even 
revised up a little between June and October.  
 
Interestingly, the assumption regarding foreign interest rates going forward deviated from the 
Bank’s standard model, which is based on the term structure of market interest rates.  The 
Norges Bank staff stated the following on page 14 in MPR 3/10:  
 
“The current low level of long-term interest rates seems to be due to particular conditions 
and probably does not provide an accurate picture of key rate expectations. It is therefore 
assumed that central bank key rates abroad and short-term rates will after a period rise 
somewhat more rapidly than currently reflected by long-term market rates”. 
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In other words, the Norges Bank standard technique for estimating forward market rates 
abroad was complemented with a considerable amount of judgment, leading to a steeper curve 
for interest rates abroad from Q3 2012 and beyond (see Figure 2.7). This judgment also 
contributed to a higher profile for Norwegian interest rate in this segment (or to be more 
precise, less of a drag from interest rates abroad on Norwegian rates. 
  
When meeting on 15 December, the Norges Bank Board lefts its key policy rate unchanged, 
as expected. The Bank’s press statement noted that “underlying inflation has been 
approximately as projected…” and that “Growth in the Norwegian economy has picked up as 
expected”. However, there was one change in the press release that particularly caught market 
participants’ attention, namely the assessment regarding the impact of low interest rates on 
growth and inflation on somewhat longer horizons.  
 
Throughout 2010 the Norges Bank repeatedly stressed the risk of future financial imbalances 
that may disturb economic activity and inflation somewhat further ahead when interest rates 
are low. In isolation, this risk suggested that the key policy rate should not be kept low for too 
long. But there had been no clear signs that this risk was materializing, as illustrated by the 
moderate pace of growth in existing home prices in the first half of 2010. Consequently, the 
Board probably did not feel any need to rush ahead with interest rate increases when inflation 
was low.  
 
But growth in existing home prices accelerated in the second half of 2010 (Figure 2.8), as did 
consumer spending. In the press release in December, the Board noted that (the Executive 
Board background note): “The rise in house prices and consumer spending has picked up 
recently. The consideration of guarding against the risk of future financial imbalances that 
may disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead suggests that the key policy rate 
should not be kept low for too long.”.  Although the Board did not provide any clear signals 
about changes in the outlook for monetary policy ahead, the emphasis on the rise in house 
prices could indicate that the increase in the risk to future financial imbalances were more 
pronounced, thus underpinning the Board’s view that the key policy rate should not be kept 
low for too long.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Estimated fwd rates, trading partners
Source:Norges Bank's Monetary Policy Report 3/2010
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Forward rates in the market increased slightly after the press release was published. But in the 
Q&A session at the press conference Deputy Governor Qvigstad underplayed the significance 
of the change in rhetoric about home prices, saying that the rise in home prices was in line 
with expectations.  
 
However, the statement by Mr.Qvigstad at the press conference represented a contradiction to 
a sentence that prevailed in the Norges Bank’s Financial Stability report No. 2/2010 published 
a couple of weeks earlier. On page 17 in the report, the Bank stated the following:  
 
“The [house] price increase in October was higher than assumed in Monetary Policy Report 
3/10”    
 
 
Assessment 
 
Indicators of economic growth picked up over the summer and in Monetary Policy Report 
3/2010 forecasts for GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 were revised up. These changes pushed 
up the interest rate forecast in 2012 and 2013. The committee would have expected these 
revisions to have contributed to a slightly higher interest rate path in 2011 as well.  
 
Moreover, the monetary policy signals provided in the press release and the press conference 
in December was somewhat confusing.  Norges Bank’s Financial Stability report No. 2/2010 
had concluded that house prices had increased more than expected, but the statement on house 
prices were much softer at the press conference in December. The committee believes the 
statement on house prices should have been less ambiguous and should have included a 
reference to possible implications for monetary policy if the sharp increase in home prices 
were to continue. Non-attributed minutes would certainly help clarifying the Board’s view on 
this matter (see section 3.3).   
              
As usual, Norges Bank’ forecast for future trading partners’ rates was mostly based on the 
term structure of interest rates prevailing in the market, allowing the Norges Bank to respond 
Figure 2.8: Existing home prices
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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swiftly to changing perceptions of the likely path for future interest rates among trading 
partners with a view to avoid excess volatility in the NOK exchange rate. 
 
However, in October the Norges Bank decided to deviate from this pattern by assuming that 
interest rates abroad will rise somewhat faster than implied by forward interest rates. 
Although this judgment did not affect interest rate prospects for 2011, and had only limited 
impact on the 2012 rate outlook, it was considered as a controversial decision by some market 
participants.   
 
In retrospect, the judgment appears well conducted considering the substantial government 
bonds sell-off in major markets that occurred in November and early December (Figure 2.9).  
 
 
 
 
NBW view 
 
The outlook for stronger growth in oil investments and exports should have contributed 
positively to the interest rate forecast for 2011.  
  
Moreover, the communication associated with the faster increase in home prices after 
the Board meeting in December should have been less ambiguous and should have 
included a discussion about possible implications for monetary policy if the sharp 
increase were to continue. Added to that, the contradicting signals whether the increase 
in house prices had increased more than expected or not, may suggest that there is scope 
for improvement when it comes to integrating financial stability considerations in the 
discussions of monetary policy. We will discuss this further in Section 3.2-3.3.  
 
Furthermore, to avoid confusion in the future, the Norges Bank may consider – as a rule 
– to discuss whether expected future rates among trading partners prevailing in the 
market look reasonable or not. Alternatively, the Bank may consider publishing an own 
path for future interest rates among trading partners based on its best judgment in its 
MPR’s (e.g. in line with the practice of the Riksbank).  
 
 
Figure 2.9: Yields on 10 year gov. bonds
Source: EcoWin, First Securities
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3.  A decade of inflation targeting.  
 
This report, NBW2011, is the twelfth report from the Norges Bank Watch. The report from 
the first Norges Bank Watch group (NBW2000) assessed monetary policy in 1999 and the 
first half of 2000. Although Norges Bank did not have an official inflation target at that time, 
the then new Governor of Norges Bank, Svein Gjedrem, had early in 1999 signaled that 
Norges Bank would no longer fine-tune movements in the krone exchange rate. Discretion in 
the mandate implied that Norges Bank would place emphasis on the fundamental conditions 
for achieving exchange rate stability over time, such as stabilizing price and cost inflation, see 
the article on “Monetary Policy Challenges” by Svein Gjedrem in Aftenposten May 4, 1999 
and Norges Banks letter to the Ministry of Finance, October 21, 1999 (from which this quote 
is taken): 
 
“In order to achieve exchange rate stability against the euro, monetary policy 
instruments must be oriented in such a way that price and cost inflation is brought 
down towards the corresponding aim for inflation for the European Central Bank 
(ECB). At the same time, monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary 
recessions, as this would undermine confidence in the krone.”  
 
 
In March 2001, a formal inflation targeting framework was adopted for monetary policy. 
Guidelines were set in a Regulation by the Ministry of Finance on Monetary Policy dated 
March 29, 2001. The guidelines for monetary policy specified that “Monetary policy shall be 
aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone's national and international value, contributing to 
stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary 
policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and 
employment.” To obtain this stability, the operational target of monetary policy in Norway 
was specified to be annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5% over time. 
 
The division of responsibility between monetary and fiscal policy was also clarified. In 
particular, fiscal policy (the central government budget) should emphasize long run 
sustainability. Hence, fiscal policy should influence the exchange rate and the size of the 
internationally exposed sector in the medium term (Gjedrem, 2010).  
 
In Section 3.1 we examine the stability of the key economic variables in Norway and some 
comparable countries (Sweden, the UK, Euro countries and the US) in the inflation targeting 
period, given the new mandate. Our aim is to establish some stylized facts (summary 
statistics) of the economic performance, and in so doing, raise some issues that may be a 
concern for monetary policy in the future. Section 3.2-3.4 then discuss related topics that are 
of importance for a transparent and credible central bank like Norges Bank.  
  
 
3.1 Economic performance in the inflation targeting period – Stylized facts 
 
The record since 2001 speaks for itself. Norges Bank has successfully implemented its policy 
within an inflation targeting framework as best reflected in a consumer price (CPI) inflation 
that has moved around the target, although on average, markedly below (2 % on average since 
2001), see Figure 3.1. Although this would indicate that Norges Banks’ forecasts for inflation 
have systematically been biased upwards (since Norges Bank always predicts that inflation 
will reach the target of 2.5 % by the end of the forecast horizon), there are many factors 
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outside the central banks control that can explain this deviation, such as low prices for 
imported consumer goods. Also, compared to the other countries analyzed here, average 
inflation rates in Norway are neither exceptionally low nor high, with the US experiencing the 
highest average inflation rate of 2.4 % and Sweden the lowest; 1.5 %.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Inflation rates in selective countries 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 GDP growth rates in selective countries 
 
 
 
However, the figure also illustrates that CPI inflation fluctuates a lot, and Norway ranks 
second, after the US, in terms of volatility.1
                                                 
1 Standard deviation of CPI inflation is 1.4 in the US and 1.3 in Norway. EMU ranks the lowest, with standard 
deviation of 0.8. 
 One reason for the high variation in consumer 
prices is the extraordinary fluctuations in different product markets or changes in taxes and 
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subsidies. To ignore these temporary fluctuations, most central banks, including Norges Bank, 
therefore also construct indicators of so-called underlying inflation, where these extraordinary 
fluctuations are removed (see section 3.4).  
 
Annual growth rates for GDP mainland Norway has been 2.3 % on average in the inflation 
targeting period, which of the countries compared here, is only surpassed (marginally) by 
Sweden (Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also illustrates that throughout this period, the Norwegian 
economy has experienced two recessions, a minor one in 2002/2003 and the more serious 
recession in 2008/2009 following the international financial crisis. However, compared to its 
trading partners, the last recession in Norway turned out to be relatively mild. Whether this is 
primarily due to good policies (an active monetary and fiscal policy) or good luck (being an 
oil exporter when terms of trade increases), is an issue that needs to be examined in more 
detail. We leave this to future research, but conclude as NBW2009 and NBW2010, that 
Norges Bank played an important role in dampening the effect of the international financial 
crisis on the Norwegian economy.  
 
The main instrument in monetary policy is the interest rate. One important issue to explore 
with regard to monetary policy is how frequently and by how much Norges Bank has altered 
interest rates. Large and frequent (aggressive) interest rate changes can be beneficial if they 
bring about better economic performance, such as stable inflation and a lower inflation risk 
premium. On the other hand, large variations in interest rates increase the interest risk 
premium. Furthermore, large changes to the central bank’s signal rate are not always the most 
effective tool to influence the economy either. The impact monetary policy has on the 
economy comes from the whole yield curve, which crucially includes expectations and 
confidence in future policy as well. 
 
To evaluate the aggressiveness of monetary policy, one can look at the range of interest rates 
used, as well as the frequency and size of interest rate changes. Figure 3.3 presents the ranges 
whereas Figure 3.4 presents the standard deviation of the annual changes of these interest 
rates.  
 
In the period where Norges Bank has targeted inflation (informally from 1999 and then 
formally from 2001) Norges Bank ranks as one of the most aggressive central banks with 
regard to interest rate volatility (in this sample of countries, but also including other small 
resource rich open economies such as Australia and New Zealand). This could reflect that 
Norway is exposed to more sizeable shocks/impulses, has less emphasis on gradualism, or it 
might also be a sign of more policy errors.  
 
The committee believes that some of the volatility of the policy rate in Norway can be 
explained by the more aggressive interest rate changes in 2001-2003 (see Figure 3.3.), a 
period where one could argue that policy errors may have played a role (see NBW2004). 
Redoing the analysis from 2005 brings the volatility in Norway more in line with the other 
countries, although Norway still ranks high on volatility.  
 
Another important factor that may have contributed to reduce volatility in the last years, is 
that Norges Bank has gradually changed its communication, first by publishing strategy 
intervals for the interest rate (from July 2004), and finally by publishing its own interest rate 
forecast (from November 2005). By focusing on the forecast of the interest rates rather than 
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just the announcement of the policy rate, monetary policy has become more transparent and 
predictable.2
 
  
 
Figure 3.3 Interest rates in selective countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Standard deviation of the annual change in central bank policy rates  
 
      
Source: EcoWin and own calculations  
 
 
On a final note, the two countries that have the most aggressive central banks (Norway and 
the U.S.), are the same two countries that have experienced highest volatility in inflation. On 
                                                 
2 Related to this, Eeg (2008) finds that after 2004/2005, Norges Bank’s interest rate decisions have explained a 
smaller share of the variability in forward interest rates than previously. Related findings are also found in 
Andersson and Hoffman (2009) in the period when Norges Bank has published its own interest rate path. 
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the other scale is the ECB that is the least aggressive of the central banks and has the least 
volatile inflation rates (see footnote 1). One reason for this could be that Norges Bank and the 
Fed practice a more flexible inflation target, contributing also to smoothing fluctuations in 
output and employment, while ECB tends to focus more on the stabilisation of inflation. If 
that is the case, one would expect the growth rates in GDP to be more stable in Norway and 
the US than in the EMU.  
 
This is partly confirmed. For the period 2001-2010, the fluctuation in GDP has been less 
volatile in both Norway and the US than in countries such as Sweden and the UK. Compared 
to the EMU, however, Norway and the US have only marginally more stable growth rates.3
 
 
A concern if monetary policy is aggressive is that it may lead to increased volatility in asset 
prices. However, judging by Figure 3.5, the nominal effective exchange rate in Norway has 
been the most stable (least volatile) exchange rate of the countries analyzed here, although it 
has appreciated over the sample (10% since 1998). One exception to the stability is the period 
2001-2003, when the interest rate differential changed by a lot, thereby also contributing to 
exchange rate fluctuations (the exchange rate first appreciated sharply when interest rates 
increased, only to depreciate substantially when the interest rate was quickly brought down).   
 
The same picture of stability emerges when the nominal effective exchange rate in Norway is 
deflated by relative consumer prices (see Figure 3.6). The real exchange rate has appreciated 
slightly, in particular over the last decade, but compared to the mean of the period 1970-2010, 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate is modest. This most likely reflects the low inflation 
rates experienced in Norway due to the favourable terms of trade (low prices for imported 
consumer goods, combined with high prices for our commodities exports), preventing the real 
exchange rate from appreciating any further.   
 
This favourable picture changes somewhat when the nominal exchange rate is deflated by 
relative wages. The resulting real exchange rate (denoted by relative wages in Figure 3.6) 
shows clear evidence of declining competitiveness in the inflation targeting era compared to 
previous periods. Hence, notwithstanding the low inflation rates, labour costs have not 
remained stable in the period. In fact, Norwegian labour costs have reached an unprecedented 
high level measured by relative labour costs, and cost competitiveness has thereby weakened.  
 
Although some of the increase in labour cost could reflect increased productivity, it illustrates 
a feature of the Norwegian economy that has become more prominent in the last decade; High 
growth in employment in the public sector has come at the expense of employment in the 
manufacturing sector, where there has been a gradual decline. While 1/3 of the labour force in 
Norway today is employed in the public sector, only 10 % of the labour force is employed in 
manufacturing industries. Although there has been a decline in manufacturing employment in 
many other industrial countries, the combination of high share of employment in the public 
sector and low share of employment in the manufacturing sector is unique for Norway. This 
most likely also has impacted upon the wage formation and incentives. 
 
While the (nominal) exchange rate has remained fairly stable in the inflation targeting period, 
other asset prices, such as house and equity prices, have shown high volatility in this period, 
                                                 
3 Standard deviation of annual GDP growth rates is 2 in both the US and Norway, while in EMU standard 
deviation is 2.1. 
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also when compared to other countries. In particular, house price growth has been very high 
in the past 10-12 years, putting Norway in the lead among many countries (see Figure 3.7).  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Exchange rates in selective countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Real exchange rate. Deviation from mean, 1970 – 2010. Per cent. 
 
Source: Norges Bank  
 
 
Of the countries compared here, equity prices in Norway display the highest volatility in the 
inflation targeting period (Euro is now replaced with Germany). The high volatility is 
manifested in a much steeper increase in Norwegian equity prices in the booming years prior 
to the recent recession, and a subsequent larger decline in the recession (see Figure 3.8). Since 
most equity prices reached a through by the end of 2008, they are again on a relative steeper 
climb in Norway than in the other countries.  
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Figure 3.7 House prices in selective countries 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Equity prices in selective countries 
 
 
Clearly, there are other factors at play than monetary policy explaining the relatively high 
momentum in asset prices in Norway, such as volatile oil prices, favourable terms of trade and 
a large share of foreign investment. However, several studies have pointed out that monetary 
policy does indeed explain a large share of the variation in these asset prices, see Bjørnland 
(2009) for an analysis of the contribution of monetary policy to the variation in stock prices 
and Jacobsen and Naug (2005) and Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010) on the role of monetary 
policy in explaining movements in house prices (all studies control for other factors, such as 
foreign impulses and oil prices).4
 
  
                                                 
4 Jacobsen and Naug (2005) find that house prices react quickly and strongly to changes in interest rates. In 
particular, the low interest rates since 2003 can explain a substantial portion of house price inflation since then. 
Similar findings are documented in Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010). 
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Figure 3.9 Debt burden 
 
 
 
 
The escalating growth in asset prices may ultimately become a challenge for monetary policy. 
In particular, Norges Bank’s financial stability wing has repeatedly emphasized in their 
financial stability reports how fast growth in various asset prices (house prices in particular), 
has increased the household debt burden so that it is now very high, both historically and in 
comparison with other countries (see Figure 3.9, which is adapted from the financial stability 
report 1/2010).  
 
High debt burden makes households very vulnerable to small interest rate changes. The 
accumulation of household debt may therefore give rise to financial and economic instability 
in the longer term, thereby posing a challenge to monetary policy. We will get back to this 
issue in section 3.2. below. 
 
 
NBW’s view: 
 
It is the committee’s view that monetary policy in Norway has been a success in terms 
achieving inflation rates close to the target and contributing to sustainable growth rates 
in the Norwegian economy. Contrary to much concern when inflation targeting was 
introduced, the nominal exchange rate has also remained fairly stable over this period, 
although on average, it has appreciated slightly.  
 
Yet, despite being more gradual in its approach, Norges Bank still ranks as one of the 
most aggressive central banks with regard to interest rate volatility. The volatility was 
particularly high in the years of 2001-2003.  
 
The recent decade has also witnessed high variation in equity prices and unprecedented 
high growth rates in house prices. Notwithstanding that there are many factors 
explaining the variation in asset prices, monetary policy has clearly played a role. While 
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we do not think the high growth rates in asset prices poses a major treat at the very 
short horizon, the high pass through from short term interest rates to asset prices 
coupled with high debt ratios makes the Norwegian economy more vulnerable to shocks 
in the future.  
 
 
3.2 Financial stability and monetary policy in practice 
 
Norges Bank financial stability wing contributes information, forecasts and recommendations 
in the process leading to the monetary policy decisions (see Haugland and Vikøren, 2006). 
For instance, Norges Bank has through its financial stability reports repeatedly stressed the 
risk of future financial imbalances that may disturb economic activity and inflation somewhat 
further ahead when interest rates are low. Experience shows that financial instability builds up 
in periods of strong credit growth and asset price inflation. If household debt reaches 
unprecedented levels, it may pose a threat to macroeconomic stability at the longer horizons. 
The following quotes from the Financial Stability Report 2/2010 published in December 
illustrates well this concern: 
 
 
“Low interest rates are favouring current consumption, including housing 
consumption. Expectations of low interest rates ahead may contribute to higher debt 
growth …High debt burdens may increase households’ vulnerability to unexpected 
interest rate hikes, pronounced income shortfalls or an abrupt turnaround in the 
housing market.”  
 
 
At the press conference in December following the last monetary policy announcement, the 
report (prepared for the Executive Board) had a passage stating: 
 
 
“The rise in house prices and consumer spending has picked up recently. The 
consideration of guarding against the risk of future financial imbalances that may 
disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead suggests that the key policy rate 
should not be kept low for too long.” 
 
 
Although this passage originating from the monetary Policy Wing (PPO) echoes the concern 
raised repeatedly by the Financial Stability Wing (FST), the committee finds this expression 
somewhat vague. As was discussed in Section 2 above, while the Norges Bank’s Financial 
Stability report 2/2010 had stated clearly that the house price increase in October was higher 
than assumed in the Monetary Policy Report from October, the press conference following the 
monetary policy announcement in December underplayed the significance of the statement, 
saying that the rise in house prices was in line with expectations.  
 
Clearly both financial stability and price stability considerations should be important when 
making monetary policy decisions (see Gjedrem 2005). Yet, it is not clear to us what weight 
is attached to each consideration or how specific analysis and recommendations from 
financial stability is integrated into the actual monetary policy framework. Hence, we are not 
asking for a more comprehensive macro prudential analysis like the one the financial stability 
wing is currently providing in their financial stability reports, but a consideration as to how 
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the macro prudential analysis influences monetary policy in practice. This is in particular 
important in the current phase, since the model suit in Norges Bank has not yet fully 
incorporated financial variables. Hence, judgment as to how the risk of future financial 
imbalances may (or may not) disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead becomes 
extremely important.  
 
The committee suggests that Norges Bank makes it clearer as to how the issues of major 
concern raised by FST influence the monetary policy decisions in practice. This was a 
suggestion also raised recently in the report on the internal monetary policy process by 
Fridriksson (2010)5
 
:  
 
“The contribution of FST in the meetings where it participates might possibly be better 
coordinated with or integrated into the general preparations in the PPO; some of the 
analysis presented by the FST might perhaps be a logical part of the analytical 
preparatory work in the PPO.”  
 
 
That said there has recently been promising research cooperation at the department level in 
FST and PPO. For instance, Norges Bank is currently integrating financial frictions into the 
economic model framework, see e.g. Brubakk and Natvik (2010). These are useful additions 
to the Bank’s model suite. However, the model by Brubakk and Natvik (2010) is a rational 
expectation models (like the main model NEMO), where house price bubbles cannot exist. 
Hence, to get an effect of housing on the real economy as one has seen in some of the 
countries in this financial crisis (Ireland, Spain, UK and the US), requires the use of more 
empirically oriented models.  
 
 
NBW view  
 
The committee suggests that Norges Bank makes it clearer as to how the issues of major 
concern in financial stability influence monetary policy decisions in practice. Although 
both financial stability and price stability considerations are important when making 
monetary policy decisions, it is not clear what weight is attached to each consideration 
or how specific analysis and recommendations from financial stability is integrated into 
the actual monetary policy framework.  
 
It is in important to be clear about the role of judgment used in the current phase, since 
the model suit in Norges Bank has not yet fully incorporated financial variables. Hence, 
disclosure of judgment as to how the risk of future financial imbalances may (or may 
not) disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead becomes extremely 
important.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 In January 2010, Ingimundur Fridriksson, who has a long-standing experience with central banking and 
monetary policy, was asked by Norges Bank to assess the internal interest rate decision process in Norges Bank. 
His report was presented to the Board in October 2010. It gives an overview of the discussions and deliberations 
leading up to the publication of Monetary Policy Report 1/10 and the interest rate decision in March 2010. 
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3.3 Communication – the role of the Executive Board 
 
One important implication of having a central bank which targets inflation is that current 
economic behaviour will depend on expectations about future monetary policy. The 
communication of the central bank therefore becomes an extremely important part of 
monetary policy. Since the interest rate is the main instrument in monetary policy, equally 
important as the setting of the interest rate, is therefore the communication of the future 
course of interest rates.  
 
Norges Bank has since 2005 published its own forecast for the interest rate. This forecast is 
linked to the forecasts of the other key variables in the Bank’s objective functions (inflation 
and the output gap). These forecasts are communicated jointly in the Norges Bank’s Monetary 
Policy Report (MPR) that is published three times a year. This report is at the core of the 
communication of Norges Bank. 
 
The forecasts are updated with the arrival of new information in each MPR. The revisions of 
the forecast from one report to the next should then reflect new information (about exogenous 
factors), rather than changes in the Bank’s own assessment of economic conditions (see 
Alstadheim, Bache, Holmsen, Maih and Røisland 2010). To add credibility to the revisions of 
the forecast, the interest rate forecast is therefore accompanied by a separate chart in the MPR 
(see Figure 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 above) that attributes the revision since the previous report to the 
change in exogenous factors. “Such a precise account makes it easier for outsiders to check 
whether the Bank is consistent over time, and also imposes discipline on the internal decision 
process (Alstadheim et al. 2010, p. 5).  
 
In addition, the two last monetary policy reports have also included alternative scenarios for 
the interest rate based on different loss functions. These are useful, as they explain how the 
interest rate forecast could be changed by altering the various criteria that monetary policy 
should take into account.6
 
 
The announcement of the actual interest rate decision is accompanied by the Bank’s press 
release and a brief report (1-2 pages) following each announcement (“The Executive Board’s 
monetary policy decision - background and general assessment”). The report gives a summary 
of relevant new information that has arrived since the previous interest rate meeting with 
charts and a rather detailed list (bullet points) of the new data releases.  
 
The MPR, the press release and the report to the Executive Board with background and charts 
are informative, although the latter seems too detailed compared to the main message it 
should try to get across. Still we miss a clearer exposition of the role and explanation of the 
Bank’s use of models of various kinds in arriving at its assessment of current circumstances as 
well as the proper policy stance. We also miss the reasoning behind judgments made to 
change or override the models.  
 
The committee believes that a record of the discussion that has preceded the decisions at the 
Executive Boards meetings would be very useful and make monetary policy more transparent 
                                                 
6 For instance, MPR 2/10 showed that if Norges Bank should only take into account the consideration of 
bringing inflation rapidly back to target, that would imply lowering the interest rate below 1%. The interest rate 
would then have to be raised rapidly again to prevent activity and inflation from becoming too high further 
ahead. 
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and credible. Making such information available would require minutes to be released from 
the policy meetings. Currently, Norges Bank has decided against publishing minutes of its 
meetings. We suggest (in line with NBW2010 and many other previous Norges Bank Watch 
reports) that non-attributed minutes should be published, in order to strengthen accountability 
and further improve transparency. These minutes could note, without attribution to individual 
members, which issues were discussed and what arguments were presented.  
 
Non-attributed minutes will reveal the scope and depth of the policy discussion, but will not 
identify the individual contributions of the members. This would be useful in providing an 
indication of the degree of disagreement and/or uncertainty among the members. This, in turn, 
would assist the private sector in learning the monetary policy reaction function more 
efficiently.  
 
A prominent example of a central bank with external, part-time members that publishes such 
non-attributed minutes is the Bank of England. In the appendix we have attached an extract of 
the most recent minutes from the Bank of England’s Executive Board meeting. In our 
opinion, this provides the public with very useful information that will make any statement or 
forecast of future paths for the interest rate even more credible.  
 
Finally, the above mentioned charts in the MPR (Figures 2.4-2.6), that attribute the revision of 
the interest rate forecast since the previous report to changes in exogenous factors (such as 
petroleum investment, domestic demand, foreign interest rates etc.), are useful, but does not 
give any information as to where judgment is added into the process. In fact, without 
disclosure of this judgement, it could give the impression that there is a mathematical 
relationship between changes in economic conditions and the following changes in the 
interest rate path.  
 
Clearly, it can not be as simple as that. First, because the model (i.e. NEMO) is a 
simplification of the world, it has omitted many important variables, including house prices. If 
for instance the consideration of guarding against the risk of future financial imbalances that 
may disturb activity and inflation somewhat further ahead should suggest that the interest rate 
path is moved up (as was how the market interpreted the press release from Norges Bank in 
December 2010), technically this amendment then has to come through changes in the 
forecast of another relevant variable linked to house prices, such as for instance domestic 
demand (through collateral).7
 
  
Furthermore, the idea that the chart imposes discipline on the internal decision process could 
give the impression that there is no room for alternative views or judgement in the decision 
process in Norges Bank. If that was the case, one could easily follow up with the question as 
to how the Executive Board can contribute usefully in the decision making process. 
Publishing minutes where the Boards view is communicated would contribute positively to 
ease this concern.  
 
Finally, the following speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the 
Sveriges Riksbank, at Swedbank, Stockholm, 26 January 2011, summarizes well our view: 
 
                                                 
7 Another way would be to place more weight on stabilizing GDP (capacity utilization) in the loss function. If 
house prices increased faster than anticipated, placing more weight on GDP could imply that the interest rate was 
increased somewhat faster. 
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“The moral of the story is that monetary policy cannot be reduced to a mechanical 
reading exercise. However well-prepared the material on which monetary policy 
decisions are based, there will always be complex and important aspects that 
policymakers must take a stance on. It is important that these aspects are discussed 
from several different perspectives. This is one reason why we have an Executive 
Board made up of economists with different backgrounds and expertise. It is beneficial 
and important for us to conduct a wide-ranging debate on monetary policy at the 
Riksbank and not just externally. I believe that it leads to better monetary policy 
decisions.”  
 
 
Norges Bank view: 
 
The committee believes that a record of the discussion that has preceded the decisions at 
the Executive Boards meetings would be very useful and make monetary policy more 
transparent and credible. Making such information available would require minutes to 
be released from the policy meetings.  
 
We suggest that non-attributed minutes should be published, in order to strengthen 
accountability and further improve transparency. These minutes could note, without 
attribution to individual members, which issues were discussed and what arguments 
were presented.  
 
Non-attributed minutes will reveal the scope and depth of the policy discussion, but will 
not identify the individual contributions of the members. This would be useful in 
providing an indication of the degree of disagreement and/or uncertainty among the 
members. This, in turn, would assist the private sector in learning the monetary policy 
reaction function more efficiently.  
 
 
3.4 The forecasting process  
 
The analytical and empirical work conducted at Norges Bank is impressive; drawing on high-
level skills in diverse areas such as economic theory, statistics, econometrics, mathematics 
and programming techniques. Here we will not evaluate the analytical nor the empirical work 
any further than this, but refer the reader to previous Norges Bank Watch reports for details. 
Instead we follow up on two central issues that were raised in last year NBW report; The 
frequency for which the forecasts are updated, and an evaluation of the use of indicators of 
underlying inflation. 
 
The number of forecasts in a year  
Currently, the projected interest-rate path, as well as the forecasts for other macroeconomic 
variables, are updated and published in the monetary policy reports three times a year. Norges 
Bank has argued against writing a report every quarter, as it leaves very little time for the staff 
to digest new information and conduct thorough analyses. Recently, the Riksbank came to the 
same conclusion and reduced the number of reports from four to three per year. However, on 
the three other occasions that the executive board meets in the course of the year, the 
Riksbank publishes a press release and a monetary policy update; the latter containing a 
limited number of forecasts for central macroeconomic variables. 
31 
 
Norges Bank’s Executive Board meets eight times a year. The forecasts are not updated 
except on the three occasions when the Monetary Policy report is published. An exception 
was in December 2008, when the unexpected depth of the financial crisis required new 
forecasts for the expected policy stance.  
 
The NBW committee suggests, in line with NBW 2010, that while Norges Bank should keep 
the number of monetary policy reports at three per year, it should consider publishing a press 
release and a monetary policy update in conjunction with at least one of the other meetings of 
the Executive Board. The monetary policy update should contain a limited number of 
forecasts for central macroeconomic variables. Given the current publishing schedule, a 
natural time to provide such an update of the forecast would be the meeting of the executive 
board in December.  
 
Already, Norges Bank is updating and publishing short term forecast (4-5 quarters) from the 
system of averaging models (SAM) before each meeting of the Executive Board (that is, eight 
times a year). These graphs show the forecast from SAM from the last monetary policy report 
with uncertainty band, together with the latest official MPR forecast and an update of the 
SAM forecast, see the webpage: http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____77206.aspx  
 
The committee finds these charts with updated short term forecasts very informative and a 
useful communication. Yet, we believe Norges Bank could be more explicit about the 
implications of the update of these short term forecast for the published official forecasts of 
the key variables (including the interest rate path), at least for the quarter when there is no 
published MPR (i.e., in December).  
 
 
NBW view: 
 
The committee suggests that while Norges Bank should keep the number of monetary 
policy reports at three per year, it should consider publishing a press release and a 
monetary policy update in conjunction with at least one of the other meetings of the 
Executive Board. The monetary policy update should contain a limited number of 
forecasts for central macroeconomic variables.  
 
 
Measure of underlying inflation  
As noted in Section 3.1, most central banks, including Norges Bank, construct indicators of 
so-called underlying inflation, where these extraordinary fluctuations are removed. These 
measures will have different characteristics based on varying assumptions regarding which 
price movements will have short-term effects on the CPI and which are permanent. 
 
Figure 3.10 presents five such indices constructed for the period 2002-2010 for Norway. 
These are CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), CPI 
adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices (CPIXE), CPI 
excluding outliers from period to period (trimmed mean), CPI adjusted for frequency of price 
changes (CPI-FW) and a weighted average of various forecast of the sub-indices of CPI (CPI-
M). All indices except CPI-ATE and the trimmed mean are constructed by Norges Bank. CPI-
ATE and the trimmed mean are constructed by Statistics Norway. 
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As expected, all the indicators of underlying inflation show more stability than actual CPI. 
CPIXE is on average closest to CPI, while CPI-ATE deviates the most (0.4 percentage points 
below CPI on average). The remaining three indicators are on average higher than actual CPI 
inflation. Since CPIXE is on average higher than CPI-ATE (and closer to the mean of CPI), it 
implies that there have been mostly positive impulses that are added back to CPIXE, on the 
reason that they are permanent.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Consumer prices. 12-month change. Per cent.*  
 
 
* See the text for explanation of various measures.      Source: Norges Bank  
 
 
While we encourage Norges Bank in publishing these measures, we are more sceptical with 
regard to the use of CPIXE as their main indicator of underlying inflation in the policy 
process, for which they provide conditioned, detailed forecasts.  
 
The motivation for constructing CPIXE was that the previous measure of underlying inflation, 
CPI-ATE, did not capture trends in energy prices, because energy prices were permanently 
excluded. While we are sympathetic to this concern, CPIXE is far from an optimal indicator, 
as the historical index values are revised as new observations of energy prices are added to the 
sample. In periods with rapid changes in forward prices on energy, such a revision can be 
substantial, as emphasized by NBW 2009 and NBW 2010.  
 
In their monetary policy reports, Norges Bank does not update the data for CPIXE as it is 
revised. Hence, the effects of the revisions become suppressed. If Norges Bank continues to 
publish CPIXE in their monetary policy reports, we recommend that the final numbers are 
published as they are revised, not the real time values. Given that the final revised values of 
CPIXE will always be uncertain by construction, Norges Bank should also extend the fan 
charts backwards in time to reflect this uncertainty.  
 
Our view, however, is that Norges Bank should not use CPIXE as their main indicator of 
underlying inflation. Overreliance on CPIXE could make monetary policy less robust, since 
historical data are revised as new observations become available. Furthermore, since the 
construction of CPIXE involves evaluation and revision of historical information, it cannot 
provide a transparent indicator that Norges Bank should use as its main indicator.  
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The committee believes that it is important that an independent institution like Statistics 
Norway produce and publish the operational target used in monetary policy as their official 
statistics. CPI-ATE is such an indicator and was the main measure of underlying inflation 
used until recently.  
 
Our view is therefore that CPI-ATE (or a related indicator published by Statistics Norway) 
should be used as the focus measure, while taking its disadvantages more explicitly into 
account in times of rapid increases/decreases in forward prices on energy. This can be done 
by using the other indicators (including CPIXE) more actively, by discussing how and why 
they differ from the current CPI inflation rates.  
 
Added to that, when discussing the profile for inflation over the medium term in section 1 of 
the MPR (Monetary policy assessments and strategy), it is the committee’s view that the 
likely path for headline CPI inflation should take a more prominent role than has so far been 
the case. This should allow for a deeper discussion of the extent to which sharp increases in 
energy prices, taxes or other external disturbances may influence consumer price inflation 
over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, rather than taking for granted that any 
difference between headline CPI inflation and measures of underlying inflation are pure 
transitory  disturbances. For instance, changes in energy prices may sometimes pass-through 
to prices on other consumer goods (such as airline ticket prices) and may also impinge on 
wage formation. 
 
 
NBW view 
 
The committee suggest that CPI-ATE (or a related indicator published by Statistics 
Norway) should be used as the focus measure instead of CPIXE, while taking its 
disadvantages more explicitly into account in times of rapid increases/decreases in 
forward prices on energy. This can be done by using the other indicators more actively 
(including CPIXE), by discussing how and why they differ from the current CPI 
inflation rates.  
 
Furthermore, when discussing the profile for inflation over the medium term in section 
1 of the MPR (Monetary policy assessments and strategy), it is the committee’s view that 
the likely path for headline CPI inflation should take a more prominent role than has so 
far been the case.  
 
This should allow for a deeper discussion of the extent to which sharp increases in 
energy prices, taxes or other external disturbances may influence consumer price 
inflation over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, rather than taking for granted 
that any difference between headline CPI inflation and measures of underlying inflation 
are pure transitory  disturbances.  
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Appendix 
 
Extract from Bank of England: 
 
MINUTES OF THE MONETARY POLICY 
COMMITTEE MEETING 12 AND 13 JANUARY 2011 
 
Publication date: 26 January 2011 
 
These are extracts of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting held on 12 and 
13 January 2011. They are also available on the Internet 
 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/pdf/2011/mpc1101.pdf 
 
 
The Committee considered the case for an increase in Bank Rate at this meeting. The 
domestic and global recovery had proceeded at least as well as expected. And the most likely 
prospect was for continued growth, despite the downside risks that remained. For most 
members, the balance of risks to medium-term inflation relative to the target had moved 
upwards over the past few months, reflecting the recent and prospective buoyancy of import 
prices and the possible impact of higher near-term inflation on public inflation expectations. 
That would suggest that a lower level of demand might be consistent with hitting the inflation 
target in the medium term, and so might argue for a withdrawal of some of the current 
monetary stimulus. Moreover, an increase in Bank Rate at the current juncture might lessen 
the risk that a larger increase became necessary at a later stage if inflation persisted above 
the target. Members noted that a small increase in Bank Rate at this meeting would still leave 
monetary policy highly accommodative, and would not preclude the Committee from 
increasing the policy stimulus in future if that became necessary. 
 
 
The Committee also considered the arguments for maintaining the current level of Bank 
Rate. Inflation had been boosted by the past depreciation of sterling, and increases in VAT 
and energy prices. These effects were large and – in the view of many members – could more 
than account for the current deviation of inflation from the 2% target. This suggested that the 
margin of spare capacity had exerted downward pressure on inflation, and would continue to 
do so while demand growth remained insufficient to reduce that margin materially. Moreover, 
material downside risks to demand remained. The impact of the fiscal consolidation on 
spending was uncertain. And euro-area sovereign debt problems remained capable of 
delivering a significant jolt to UK export demand, as well as to the international banking 
system and confidence more generally. In addition, while Bank Rate had been reduced to an 
exceptionally low level, the effective stimulus had been offset by the reduced supply of credit: 
since the onset of the financial crisis the interest rates faced by many households and 
businesses had fallen by less than Bank Rate, and in some cases had increased. On this view, 
the balance of risks continued to suggest that inflation would fall back to around the target 
once the impact of the factors boosting it had dissipated. 
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Some members also noted that an increase in Bank Rate at this meeting might be 
misinterpreted as a signal that the Committee would attempt to bring inflation back to the 
target excessively rapidly, which could cause expectations of a relatively sharp tightening of 
monetary policy that could have a detrimental impact on confidence and activity. 
 
There was a spectrum of views among Committee members about how much weight to 
place on the arguments for and against a change in the policy stance. 
 
For most members, recent developments implied that the risks to inflation in the medium 
term had probably shifted upwards. For some of those members, the decision this month was 
finely balanced. The analysis that fed into the forthcoming February Inflation Report 
projections would provide an opportunity to assess fully the developments since the previous 
Report, and to evaluate more thoroughly the risks to inflation in the medium term. The 
publication of the Report would also give the Committee the opportunity to explain fully its 
assessment of the outlook and its policy decisions. 
 
For two members, the evidence suggested that the balance of risks was already sufficiently 
clear to warrant an immediate increase in Bank Rate. The continued elevated rate of inflation, 
which was forecast to persist, posed a significant risk to inflation expectations and hence to 
the medium-term outlook for inflation. This made more powerful the case which had been 
building for some time for a gradual rise in Bank Rate.  
 
For one member, the balance of risks to inflation continued to warrant an expansion of the 
Committee’s programme of asset purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank 
reserves, because it was likely that inflation would fall to below the target in the medium 
term. This member acknowledged that a sustained upward trend in commodity prices or in 
global demand prospects, or a shift in sentiment against sterling, could outweigh the domestic 
forces pushing down on inflation. But this member did not see this risk as yet large enough to 
require a policy tightening.  
 
